The Foreign Emoluments Clause

And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them [the United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

—Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman

Introduction

The Foreign Emoluments Clause limits the ability of certain federal officials to accept presents, emoluments, offices, or titles from foreign governments. The clause traces its roots to a Dutch law that banned Netherlands officials from accepting gifts from foreign governments. Although the Articles of Confederation had its own Foreign Emoluments Clause, little debate occurred during the Philadelphia Convention about the Constitution’s analogous provision, which departed from its Articles predecessor. This provision gives rise to questions about the original public meaning of “emolument,” how Congress can consent to a covered officer’s accepting a foreign emolument, what constitutes a “foreign State,” and which federal officers are covered by the clause.

History Before 1787

Many provisions of the Constitution were premised on English statutes and parliamentary precedents. By contrast, the roots of the Foreign Emoluments Clause lie in the Netherlands. A 1651 Dutch law prohibited government officials from taking any gifts “of whatever sort” from foreign governments.¹ At the time, it was a common diplomatic practice for a host country to give expensive gifts to departing diplomats from foreign countries. The Dutch rule was something of an outlier. Abraham de Wicquefort, a Dutch political writer, criticized the rule. Because “[t]he custom of making a present . . . is so well established,” he said, and “is of as great an extent as the law of nations itself, there is reason to be surprised at the regulation that has been made on that subject in Holland.”²

The Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, apparently borrowed from this Dutch rule. Article VI, Section 1 provides that no “person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them [i.e., any state], [shall] accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.”³ This text applied to certain officers in both the Articles and state governments. The authors of this essay take the position that delegates to the Confederation Congress held neither an “office . . . under the United States” nor an office under any state and therefore were not subject to this provision.⁴

The Articles’ text imposed an absolute prohibition against covered officers accepting foreign gifts. However, one scholar suggests that the “accepted interpretation” followed the Dutch rule, under which the gift could be kept if the diplomat’s home government granted permission.⁵ In 1780, for instance, before the Articles were ratified, Arthur Lee was a minister from the United States to the Court of Versailles. When Lee departed from France, King Louis XVI gave him a gold snuffbox set with diamonds and a picture of the monarch as a “mark of his Majesty’s esteem.” This type of gift was not uncommon; it was the sort of gift the French king gave to other departing ministers.⁶ Lee deposited the box with the President of the Continental Congress, as he did not think he could retain it “without express approbation of Congress.” Congress “approve[d] of his retaining the picture” that was “set with the diamonds.”⁷

Subsequent to the Articles’ ratification, in 1785, Benjamin Franklin concluded his service as minister to France.⁸ Upon Franklin’s departure, King Louis XVI gave him a snuffbox similar to the one he had given Lee and set with more than 400 diamonds.⁹ On March 3, 1786, Congress approved Franklin’s keeping the gift.¹⁰ That same day, Congress also gave permission to John Jay, a minister to Spain, to keep a horse presented by the king of Spain.¹¹ This practice would inform the Foreign Emoluments Clause under the Constitution.

The Constitutional Convention

During the Constitutional Convention, there was little discussion about the Foreign Emoluments Clause. The Committee of Detail proposed that “[t]he United States shall not grant any Title of Nobility.”¹² This provision was adopted unanimously.¹³ Immediately after this vote, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina “urged the necessity of preserving foreign Ministers & other officers of the U. S. independent of external influence.” He proposed an amendment after the Title of Nobility Clause: “No person holding any office of profit or trust under the U.S. shall without the consent of the Legislature, accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince or foreign State.”¹⁴ The motion was passed unanimously without any recorded debate.¹⁵

This text was referred to the Committee of Style.¹⁶ The Committee appears to have made slight alterations. For example, it changed “office of profit or trust under the United States” to “Office of Profit or Trust under them.” Here, “them” refers back to “the United States” referenced in the Title of Nobility Clause. (See Essay No. 75.) At the time of the Framing, “the United States” was viewed as a plural entity—a grouping of states—rather than as a single collective entity.¹⁷ The Committee also changed “consent of the Legislature” to “Consent of the Congress.” The final, adopted text provided that “[n]o Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”¹⁸

The Ratification Debates

The Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed that the Constitution would limit opportunities for foreign corruption. In Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “[o]ne of the weak sides of republics . . . is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign corruption.” In the Virginia convention, Edmund Randolph said that the Foreign Emoluments Clause “is provided to prevent corruption.”¹⁹ Randolph mentioned that “a box was presented to our ambassador by the king of our allies.”²⁰ This was likely a reference to one of the snuffboxes given by King Louis XVI. The clause “was thought proper,” Randolph explained, “in order to exclude corruption and foreign influence, to prohibit any one in office from receiving or holding any emoluments from foreign states.”²¹ Nevertheless, in both cases, the recipients were allowed to keep their diplomatic gifts.

Early Practice

In May 1798, Congress held its first debate on the Foreign Emoluments Clause.²² Thomas Pinckney had served as an ambassador to Great Britain and Spain. At the end of his service, he received gifts from those foreign governments. After Pinckney returned to the United States, he asked Congress for permission to keep those gifts. By the time the House considered the request, Pinckney had been elected to Congress.²³ Representative James A. Bayard of Delaware asked whether the former ambassador still needed permission. Representative John Claiborne of Virginia insisted that Pinckney still needed to obtain congressional consent. This debate reveals early disagreement about the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause.

The Original Public Meaning of “Emolument”

The Foreign Emoluments Clause restricts the acceptance of “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever.” During the first Trump Administration, one federal trial court contended that an “emolument” was “commonly understood by the founding generation to encompass any ‘profit,’ ‘gain,’ or ‘advantage.’”²⁴ One scholar wrote that Founding-era dictionaries did not define an “emolument” as compensation tied to employment.²⁵

We think these readings of “emolument” are too broad. The U.S. Supreme Court has observed that “the term emoluments” refers to “every species of compensation or pecuniary profit derived from a discharge of the duties of the office.”²⁶ Under this definition, emoluments would not include profits from private business transactions that are not connected to the discharge of the duties associated with holding public office. A corpus linguistics study of Founding-era sources supports this more restricted definition.²⁷

This understanding of the term is further supported by scholarship collecting evidence from the Founding era and the early Republic.²⁸ First, under the Articles of Confederation government, George Washington served as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. During this period, Washington’s accounts in England were paid dividends by the Bank of England, an instrumentality of a foreign government.²⁹ We think Washington was subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause under the Articles of Confederation but did not violate it because the dividends he received were not “emoluments.”³⁰ These profits were not tied to the discharge of the duties of an office.

Second, under the Constitution, President George Washington purchased four lots of land in 1793 at a public auction in the new federal capital.³¹ The Domestic Emoluments Clause, also known as the Presidential Compensation Clause, provides that the President “shall not receive . . . any other Emolument from the United States.”³² (See Essay No. 61.) Washington paid for and received valuable land from the federal government beyond his regular salary.³³ If an “emolument” includes anything of value, then Washington would have violated the Domestic Emoluments Clause. The better reading, we contend, is that “emolument” is limited to the lawful compensation or profits that arise from the discharge of the duties of an office. Under this position, Washington was not a lawbreaker.³⁴

How Does Congress Provide Consent?

The text of the Articles of Confederation imposed an absolute ban on officials accepting any presents, emoluments, offices, or titles from foreign governments. Under the federal Constitution, the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not impose such an absolute ban. Rather, the covered officer must seek congressional consent. Congress provides consent by enacting a statute.

Based on past practice, it would appear that Congress can also consent by means of a “joint resolution,” which under modern nomenclature is merely a statute by another name. For example, in 1896, Congress “authorized” by a joint resolution former President Benjamin Harrison “to accept certain medals presented to him by the Governments of Brazil and Spain during the term of his service as President of the United States.”³⁵

We are not aware of any instance in which Congress purported to consent to a covered officer’s receiving a foreign state gift by approving a mere concurrent resolution that was not presented to the President. In whatever form congressional consent is presented, the President may veto such a bill or joint resolution, and Congress could override the President’s veto.

What Is a “Foreign State”?

The Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to any “present, Emolument, Office, or Title . . . from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has considered whether different entities related to foreign governments constitute a “foreign state.” In 1986, OLC found that two National Aeronautics and Space Administration scientists could work at a foreign public university because that institution made employment decisions independent of the foreign government.³⁶

In 2009, President Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, which included a cash award of approximately $1.4 million.³⁷ At the time, scholars observed that the “five-member Nobel commission is elected by the Storting, the parliament of Norway.”³⁸ However, OLC concluded that “the Norwegian Nobel Committee was not a ‘King, Prince, or foreign State.’”³⁹ Therefore, the Nobel Prize was not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. OLC also stated, absent evidence or argument, that “[t]he President surely ‘hold[s] an[] Office of Profit or Trust’” and is subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.⁴⁰ (See infra, “Is the President Subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause?”)

Are Members of Congress Subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause?

Under the Articles of Confederation, both federal and state officers were subject to the Articles’ Foreign Emoluments Clause; under the federal Constitution, the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to those who hold “any Office of Profit or Trust under” the United States. It is generally accepted that this provision applies only to those holding positions in the federal government and not to those holding state positions. There is some support for the view that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies at least to appointed positions in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.⁴¹ However, Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram David Amar have suggested that the terms “office” and “officer” extend only to the executive and judicial branches and that such language does not include elected members of Congress. One can also infer that under their approach, the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not reach subordinate positions in the legislative branch, such as the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate.⁴²

Professor Zephyr Teachout and other scholars contend that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to members of Congress.⁴³ In Teachout’s view, the phrase “Office . . . under the United States” refers to “elected and appointed officials.”⁴⁴ In our view, “Office . . . under the United States” refers to appointed positions in the executive and judicial branches as well as to appointed positions in the legislative branch. The elected members of Congress do not hold an “Office . . . under the United States.”⁴⁵ Thus, they are not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. On this point, we agree with the Amars.⁴⁶

Some historical evidence distinguishes members from those holding covered offices. In 1798, during the House debate about Pinckney’s gift, Representative Edward Gallatin of Pennsylvania stated that members are situated differently from officers. Gallatin “did not believe that permission could legally be granted to any member of Congress to receive any such present[.]”47 In short, Gallatin thought members were distinguishable from officers: The latter can get consent under the Foreign Emoluments Clause, but members of Congress cannot. Gallatin appears to have been the lone supporter of this view.

If Senators and Representatives hold an “Office . . . under the United States,” they would be subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Under this view, a member of one house of Congress who wishes to accept a foreign state gift must seek consent both from his house and from the other house. This arrangement would violate principles of cameral autonomy: Generally, members of one house do not have to seek “consent” from the other house in regard to their official duties.⁴⁷ In any event, the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (1966) restricts the abilities of members of Congress, the President, and those holding other elected and appointed positions in the federal government from accepting foreign state gifts.⁴⁸

Is the President Subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause?

During the first Trump Administration, a federal district court ruled that the President is covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause.⁴⁹ The court posited that “the term ‘United States’ is used in the Constitution to distinguish between” officers in “the federal and state governments.”⁵⁰ A “federal office holder” such as the “President holds his office ‘under the United States.’”⁵¹ Teachout reaches a similar conclusion based on debates from the Virginia convention. Edmund Randolph contended that the President “is restrained from receiving any present or emolument whatever. It is impossible to guard better against corruption.”⁵² George Mason worried that foreign governments could exert pressure on the American President. Mason said, “This very executive officer may, by consent of Congress, receive a stated pension from European potentates.”⁵³ Mason and Randolph, neither of whom signed the Constitution, assumed that the President was subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.⁵⁴

In our view, the question whether the “Foreign Emoluments Clause[] reaches any or all federal elected positions—i.e., Representative, Senator, Vice President, President, and presidential elector—poses a difficult interpretive challenge.”⁵⁵ Our position is that the weight of the textual evidence supports the conclusion that the elected President does not hold an “Office . . . under the United States.”⁵⁶ Presidential practice from the early Republic is consistent with our position that the President is not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.⁵⁷

President George Washington received, accepted, and kept a full-length portrait of King Louis XVI, with a valuable frame, from the French ambassador to the United States.⁵⁸ The framed portrait was a diplomatic gift from the French government. President Washington also received, accepted, and kept the main key to the Bastille, along with a picture of the Bastille, from the Marquis de Lafayette, who, at that time, was a French government official. Washington publicly displayed these gifts in the capital during his term. These gifts were later sent to Mount Vernon after Washington’s term concluded, and they remain on display there. Washington never sought congressional consent to accept these gifts. We have found no records of any contemporaneous objections raised in Congress, by the press, or in contemporaneous private correspondence. We also have found no records of subsequent historians or other academics objecting to Washington’s practice.

President Thomas Jefferson, like President Washington, openly accepted foreign state gifts without seeking congressional consent. Jefferson accepted gifts from Thaddeus Kosciuszko that may have been considered foreign state gifts.⁵⁹ President Jefferson received a bust of Czar Alexander I. It appears that this was a diplomatic gift from the Russian government. Jefferson received, accepted, and kept this gift. Jefferson also received presents from Indian tribes, which he considered diplomatic gifts from foreign nations. The Tunisian envoy gave President Jefferson several valuable horses as a gift. Jefferson did not keep the horses as his personal property, nor did he seek congressional consent to keep these gifts; rather, he sold the horses to fund the envoy’s stay in the United States. If the horses were the federal government’s property, and not Jefferson’s property, he would have needed legal authority to sell them. We are not aware of any such authority, and Jefferson did not expressly ask Congress for permission to sell the horses.

Presidents James Madison and James Monroe (the fourth and fifth Presidents, respectively) also received a foreign state gift.⁶⁰ The history here, however, is far more complex than the history of the Washington gifts. In 1816, the revolutionary government of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata declared independence from Spain. The self-proclaimed ruler of that breakaway nation sent two pistols to President Madison through diplomatic channels. Madison never responded to the ruler, nor did he seek congressional consent to keep the pistols. When Madison’s term concluded, he apparently gave the pistols to his successor, President Monroe. Monroe never sought congressional consent, and he did not deposit the pistols with the United States government. Today, the pistols are on display in the James Monroe museum.

The conduct of Madison and Monroe is consistent with our position that the President is not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. We add that even if the President is not subject to the clause—or, better, because the President is not subject to that provision—it is highly prudent for a President to regift such objects promptly. Doing so would have the effect of muting objections by political opponents that he is exploiting his position or acting in any self-interested manner.

We have found no report or any evidence that any antebellum President had ever asked Congress for consent to accept a gift from a foreign state. Such a request would have been the clearest evidence possible that the President viewed himself as subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause. However, we have identified four other Presidents who took related actions. Presidents Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, and John Tyler received foreign state gifts. Jackson declined to accept a gold medal from Colombia and asked Congress to dispose of it. Van Buren and Tyler asked Congress to dispose of gifts that each had received from the Imam of Muscat. Additionally, President Abraham Lincoln asked Congress to dispose of gifts he had received from the king of Siam.⁶¹

We have identified six other Presidents who (likely) accepted foreign state gifts and did not surrender them.⁶² We say likely because the records are not entirely clear. President James K. Polk received a table of marble from Tunis. It is not clear whether the gift came from the American consul to Tunisia or was a foreign state gift from the Tunisian government. President Andrew Johnson accepted foreign state gifts from the queen of Hawaii. President Ulysses S. Grant received foreign gifts from the queen of Madagascar and the Samoan government. President Chester A. Arthur received foreign state gifts from a diplomatic delegation from Madagascar. President Woodrow Wilson received a valuable tapestry from the French government. And President Herbert Hoover received valuable gifts from the king of Siam. None of these Presidents sought congressional consent to accept these gifts.

It seems that presidential efforts to comply with the Foreign Emoluments Clause peaked in the 1830s—and went downhill thereafter. There is no singular, clear stream of authority in regard to practice under this provision. In our view, practices during the early Republic are more probative than later practices, and President Washington’s practices are the most probative, particularly where they were public and uncontested.⁶³

As of July 2025, OLC has not yet publicly considered this evidence. However, the Congressional Research Service and the Civil Division of the Department of Justice have taken notice of these practices from President George Washington and his administration and, more generally, the early Republic.⁶⁴ This seems to indicate that the Congressional Research Service and the Civil Division are of the view that the issue of the applicability of the Foreign Emoluments Clause to the presidency remains unsettled.

Open Questions

• Can the judiciary enforce the Foreign Emoluments Clause? Must such a suit be brought against a covered officer in his official, individual, or personal capacity?⁶⁵ Does the Constitution provide a cause of action to enforce the Foreign Emoluments Clause?⁶⁶ Would such an implied cause of action be consistent with DeVillier v. Texas (2024)?⁶⁷
• What must a recipient do to “accept” a foreign state present, emolument, office, or title? Can the recipient deposit the present in a government facility until he leaves office and then claim it? The Office of Legal Counsel has suggested that this workaround may be permissible.⁶⁸
• If a wholly-owned or majority-owned corporation or commercial entity accepts a foreign state present, is that present imputed to the majority stockholder? Is working control, even if less than majority control, sufficient to impute receipt of a foreign state present, emolument, office, or title?
• Can foreign statutory (or other) benefits that all receive on the same terms be construed as a foreign state present? Would a diplomat living abroad who receives fire, police, or state-provided medical services from the foreign government run afoul of the Foreign Emoluments Clause?
• If a foreign government or state is not recognized by the United States, or if it is a revolutionary government or amidst civil war, is it a foreign state for the purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause? Would the acceptance of a present from such a government amount to official diplomatic recognition of that foreign state?⁶⁹

1. 4 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law 579 (1906); Liam Edward Cronan, “In Defiance of Gifts”: The Dutch Origins of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 40 Touro L. Rev. 465 (2025), https://ssrn.com/abstract=4590349. ↩︎
2. Monsieur de Wicquefort, The Embassador and His Functions 292 (John Digby trans., London, Bernard Lintott 1716), https://bit.ly/3DSvB3o. ↩︎
3. Articles of Confederation, art. VI, § 1. ↩︎
4. Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part IV: The “Office . . . under the United States” Drafting Convention, 62 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 475 (2023). ↩︎
5. Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 30, 36 (2012). ↩︎
6. 18 J. Cont. Cong., 1780, September 7–December 29, at 1114–15 (Wash., GPO 1910) (entry for December 1, 1780). ↩︎
7. Id. at 1115. ↩︎
8. Benjamin Franklin: First American Diplomat, 1776–1785, U.S. Dep’t of State, Off. of the Historian, https://perma.cc/QME8-G3TG. ↩︎
9. Letter from William Temple Franklin to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 27, 1790), https://perma.cc/P9WB-D35U. ↩︎
10. 30 J. Cont. Cong., 1786, January 2–July 31, at 95 (Wash., GPO 1934) (entry for March 3, 1786). ↩︎
11. Id. ↩︎
12. 2 Farrand’s 169, 183, 187. ↩︎
13. Id. at 384. ↩︎
14. Id. at 389. ↩︎
15. Id. ↩︎
16. Id. at 572. ↩︎
17. Minor Myers, Supreme Court Usage and the Making of an “Is,” 11 Green Bag 2d 457, 457–58 (2008). ↩︎
18. 2 Farrand’s 657. ↩︎
19. 3 Elliot’s 465. ↩︎
20. Id. ↩︎
21. Id. ↩︎
22. 5 Annals of Cong., 5th Cong., 2d Sess. 1582–95 (1798). ↩︎
23. Pinckney, Thomas 1750–1828, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, https://perma.cc/4A56-PF89. ↩︎
24. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d 875, 891 (D. Md. 2018), judgment vacated sub nom. Trump v. D.C., 141 S.Ct. 1262 (2021), and vacated 838 F. App’x 789 (4th Cir. 2021). ↩︎
25. John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806 (July 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/RS75-VQXL. ↩︎
26. Hoyt v. United States, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 109 (1850). ↩︎
27. James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of American English from 1760–1799, 59 S. Tex. L. Rev. 181, 195 (2018). ↩︎
28. Amandeep Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 639 (2017); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of “Emoluments” in the Constitution, 52 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2018). ↩︎
29. National Banks—English and American, 14 Am. Q. Rev. 493, 504 (1833). ↩︎
30. Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part IV, supra at 476. ↩︎
31. Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 759 (2017). ↩︎
32. Art. II, § 1, cl. 7. ↩︎
33. Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, Joint Written Statement Before the Subcomm. on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management (Sept. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/QG39-77MP. ↩︎
34. Josh Blackman & Seth Tillman, Who Was Right About the Emoluments Clauses? Judge Messitte or President Washington?, Volokh Conspiracy (Aug. 3, 2018), https://perma.cc/FU5R-4YHW; Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, The Inspector General, General Services Administration, Refuses to Acknowledge Her Plain Error About the Domestic Emoluments Clause, Volokh Conspiracy (Oct. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/VZ3U-JAZ6. ↩︎
35. J. Res. 39, 54th Cong., 29 Stat. 759 (1896). ↩︎
36. Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Off. of Legal Counsel, Re: Emoluments Clause Questions Raised by NASA Scientist’s Proposed Consulting Arrangement with the University of New South Wales (May 23, 1986). ↩︎
37. Press Release, The Norwegian Nobel Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009 (Oct. 9, 2009), https://perma.cc/MU5H-FQPP. ↩︎
38. Ronald D. Rotunda & J. Peter Pham, Obama Barred Constitutionally from Accepting Nobel, Wash. Post (Oct. 16, 2009), https://perma.cc/KUC8-5C24. ↩︎
39. Applicability of the Emoluments Clause & the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 Op. O.L.C. 370, 370 (2009). ↩︎
40. Id. at 374. ↩︎
41. Seth Barrett Tillman & Josh Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part II: The Four Approaches, 61 S. Tex. L. Rev. 321 (2021). ↩︎
42. Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 113, 115 (1995). ↩︎
43. Teachout, supra; Lawrence Lessig, A Reply to Professor Hasen, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 61, 70 (2013); Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 226 n.11 (1974). ↩︎
44. Teachout, supra at 47. ↩︎
45. Seth Barrett Tillman & Josh Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part V: The Elector Incompatibility, Impeachment Disqualification, Foreign Emoluments, and Incompatibility Clauses, 63 S. Tex. L. Rev. 237, 298 (2024). ↩︎
46. Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part II, supra at 368. ↩︎
47. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can a Statute Fix It?, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 960, 996–1007 (2007). ↩︎
48. 5 U.S.C. § 7342(a)(1)(E); Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part V, supra at 394–96. ↩︎
49. District of Columbia v. Trump, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 882. ↩︎
50. Id. at 884. ↩︎
51. Id. ↩︎
52. 3 Elliot’s 486. ↩︎
53. Id. at 484. ↩︎
54. Seth Barrett Tillman & Josh Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part III: The Appointments, Impeachment, Commissions, and Oath or Affirmation Clauses, 62 S. Tex. L. Rev. 349, 402–03 (2023). ↩︎
55. Zephyr Teachout & Seth Barrett Tillman, The Foreign Emoluments Clause: Article I, Section 9, Clause 8, Nat’l Const. Ctr., https://perma.cc/SGQ6-ZHM4. ↩︎
56. Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part IV, supra at 458–60. ↩︎
57. Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part V, supra at 305. ↩︎
58. Id. at 308–17. ↩︎
59. Id. at 318–37. ↩︎
60. Id. at 337–47. ↩︎
61. Id. at 353–55. ↩︎
62. Id. at 382–89. ↩︎
63. Josh Blackman, Defiance and Surrender, 59 S. Tex. L. Rev. 157 (2017); Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part V, supra at 411–24. ↩︎
64. Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part V, supra at 399–407; Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, Biden Office of Legal Counsel Departs from Obama-Era Opinions, and Reverts to Reagan-Era Opinions, on the Difference Between “Officer of the United States” and “Office under the United States,” Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 19, 2025), https://perma.cc/DMJ6-WVUJ. ↩︎
65. Josh Blackman, The President’s Three Bodies After Trump v. United States, Volokh Conspiracy (July 4, 2024), https://perma.cc/KV94-W56R. ↩︎
66. Josh Blackman & Seth Barrett Tillman, The Unresolved Threshold Issues in the Emoluments Clauses Litigation: The President Has Three Bodies and There Is No Cause of Action for Ultra Vires Conduct, 20 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 163 (2022). ↩︎
67. 601 U.S. 285 (2024). ↩︎
68. Memorandum Opinion, Off. of Legal Counsel, Regarding Proposal That the President Accept Honorary Irish Citizenship 278, 280–81 (May 10, 1963), https://perma.cc/QZS4-F2AN; Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part V, supra at 369–70. ↩︎
69. Tillman & Blackman, Offices and Officers of the Constitution, Part V, supra at 337. ↩︎